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Characteristics of Operator, Automatic Equipment and
Designer in Plant Automation
A Lecture
By Jens Rasmussen
Introduction
The introduction of the digital computer to the field of process control gives rise to a
rapid change of the technology used in the realization of automatic control systems.  As is al-
ways the case in periods with fast technological progress, this means that the reliability of ad-
vanced systems cannot be demonstrated by experience from systems already operating, but has
to be evaluated in the design phase by systematic methods of analysis.
The flexibility and capacity of the process computer, which is a mass-produced and
thus a cheap and reliable piece of equipment, open very promising possibilities to the control
engineer of automating very complicated functions closely related to the conditions in individ-
ual plants.
In this development the designer has to compare the reliability obtained with auto-
matic equipment with that obtainable with human operators; here he must consider not only the
abilities of the operator as known from conventional systems, but also the abilities he will have
when he is supported in his task by a process computer with its capacity for providing efficient
man - machine communication.  Furthermore the designer has to face the fact that automation
merely transfers the human task from supervision and control of the plant to supervision and
testing of the automatic control system.
To find the optimal level of automation the designer therefore has to evaluate the two
alternatives for the different control tasks, a human operator effectively supported by the in-
strumentation, and automatic equipment supervised and tested by a human operator.  In both
cases the human element - operator or designer - may be a major source of failure, and regard-
less of the level of automation the functioning of the entire system must be broken down to
elementary tasks which can be related to the characteristics of automatic equipment, operator
and designer., and for these tasks quantitative reliability data have to be found.
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5The Control System
The control system of a process plant is a system in which automatic equipment and a
human operator co-operate.  Normally the operator is not just one,, but several persons, whose
intercommunication is not considered in the present discussion, but is dealt with elsewhere.1
The input information to.the control system may be split into two categories: the
specifications. defining the desired mode of operation, and the state .information, describing
the actual conditions in the plant.  From this information the control system generates the sig-
nals needed to control the plant during normal operation and in abnormal situations.  This im-
plies that the control system must be capable of a variety of transformations between input in-
formation and control signals corresponding to different operational modes.  These transforma-
tions necessitate the presence in the control system of various transformation models based
upon,a great amount of system information, i.e. detailed knowledge about physical, technical
and economic aspects of the plant and the different possible modes of operation under normal
and failure conditions.
The specifications originate from sources outside the control system.  They may be
general in nature, giving e.g. economic optimizing criteria, or they may be rather detailed,
specifying e.g. the operational state; this will depend upon the extent to which the technical and
economic planning functions are included in the model of the control system, Inadequate com-
munication of specifications, especially of system specifications from user to designer, may be
a major source of reliability problems, especially in highly automated plants, where economic
consideration of abnormal operation is an important design task.
The state information is supplied to the control system by the measuring channels,
and the amount of state information necessary depends largely upon the complexity of the
transformation models in the control system.  A large amount of redundancy in the state infor-
mation during normal operation is necessary for the detection and identification of abnormal
operation, and an optimal choice by the designer of state information and transformation pro-
cedures must be based upon analysis, including reliability considerations.
The system information needed for the transformations can be made available to the
control system by the designer in different ways, depending upon the object of the transforma-
tion in question.
The designer may provide the control system with means of extracting and storing
system information from the state information during operation by utilizing optimizing or
learning procedures in operator or instrumentation.  In this case the transformation model is a
purely abstract or formal model, describing the relation between control signals and their re-
sponse in state variables with no information of the physical properties of the plant.  This mode
of transformation is able to maintain or even refine the quality of transformations during op-
eration.
Another possibility for the designer is to condense the system information into fixed
sets of transformations linking patterns of state variables to the appropriate control signals.
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6This transformation model will also be purely formal, but the stored system information will
not be automatically maintained during operation.  If the transformation model is engaged in a
reversible, feedback function, the degradation of the stored system information can be detected
during normal operation; if the model has a discrete, irreversible function, special testing pro-
cedures are necessary to detect degradation of equipment or operator performance.
The designer may realize a transformation model of this nature by selecting the
structure and parameters of automatic equipment, e.g. conventional feedback controllers, fixed
sequence control and simple automatic protection circuits, or he may train an operator to follow
instructions in fixed, automatic stimulus-response reactions.
If the control system has to cope with operational conditions which the designer is
unable to analyse in the design phase, and which do not leave sufficient time for the system to
evaluate a proper control action, in an experimental adaptive mode,,, the control action must be
based upon a large amount of detailed system information describing physical and technical
Properties of the plant and control system, and upon a general method of generating in the ac-
tual case a suitable transformation model from this system information.  This mode of opera-
tion today characterizes the intelligent human operator who has a fundamental understanding
and knowledge of the nature and functioning of the plant.
Tasks of the Control System in different Modes of Plant Operation
The designer's choice of a method of storing system information in the control syster-
n depends very much upon the operational tasks in question.
Normal Operation
During normal operation the control system has to generate control signals that pro-
vide for production within the limits specified for the system.
The physical nature of the plant normally calls for a control system of a multilevel
structure.  The lower levels are characterized by a great number of simple functions corre-
sponding to the different subsystems of the plant,, but with a very heavy input - output data
traffic in contrast to the complicated transforms with little traffic in the higher coordinating
levels of the system.
The normal operation is generally accessible to analysis by the designer, who may
therefore condense the system information into fixed, purely formal transformations.  As the
tasks during normal operation are of the nature of a reversible, feedback mode of function with
ample time for experimentation, the designer may also utilize adaptive or learning features in
the control system.
Abnormal conditions due to Failures
Abnormal conditions here means operating conditions that are not properly counter-
acted by the formal transformation model normally operating in the control system.  In the ad-
vent of such situations the tasks of the control system are changed rather radically.  Although
the ultimate purpose is still to control the plant in an economically optimal way, the control
7system now has to take into account the risk of losses from damage to the plant.  The immedi-
ate goal of the control system as well as its mode of operation is changed as the plant may show
fast response to failures that leaves no time for closed-loop cut and try operation, and as absent
or incorrect control action may have serious consequences.
The task of the control system in case of failures may be divided into separate steps.
First the control system has to detect the departure from normal operation., that is to uncover
failures in the plant as well as in the control system itself.  This may consist in the detection of
abnormal state variables or of changes in system properties through abnormal plant response.
The detection initiates an identification, not necessarily of the faulty component, but of the
properties of the failing system.  On the basis of the identification, the consequences of differ-
ent possible counter-measures upon the plant and its operation have to be predicted and a deci-
sion about the optimal action must be made.
This sequence of tasks has to be simulated in detail by the designer, and the results
must be stored as complicated transformation models in the control system; or he must enable
the control to make the evaluations on the basis of stored basic system information.
The detection of departure from normal operation thus switches the control system
from a mode of operation based upon a purely formal transformation model,, considering only
average cost, to a mode that needs a transformation model corresponding closely to detailed
physical and technological properties of the plant, considering mainly the immediate risk.
Changes of operational Conditions.  Sequence Control
Changes in operational conditions may be initiated and the operation specified by
sources outside the control system., e.g. start - stop procedures, or by the control system, e.g.
protecting actions.  The control system has to generate a sequence of control signals that lead
the different subsystems of the plant to other states of operation in a coordinated way.  Again
the control system acts as a hierarchy, the lower levels of which take care of the corresponding
subsystems,, with higher coordinating levels.
Planned Abnormal Operation
Apart from periods with failures in the plant or control system, there will always be
periods with operating conditions departing from those during normal production., such as ini-
tial plant operation, testing after major repairs or replacement of equipment, and testing of
protective control equipment.  During such periods the system operating, may not be described
by the system information normally available to the control system, and during the planning of
these periods special measures must be taken to remedy this by means of special equipment,
procedures or education.
Allocation of Control Tasks to Operator, Instrunentation and Designer
The control system is formed by the co-operation of an instrumentation system and
the hu-nan operator.  Both are able to work in three different modes as discussed above: a
purely formal transformation mode, adapted to past experience, a fixed formal mode based on
ordered recalling of stored procedures, and a mode with transformations especially adapted to
8the actual operating conditions., based upon a detai.led transformation model related to the
physical properties of the plant., The mode of operation to be chosen depends upon the opera-
tional conditions and the ability of the designer to analyse them in advance.  To make complete
automation possible, this analysis should cover not only the primary specifications, (technical
as well as economic), and physical functioning, (anatomy and dynamic properties), but also
possible and allowed operational modes, frequency and operational consequences of failures in
plant and control system, the related patterns of state variables and counter-rqeasures, and fi-
nally the "improbable", but risky combinations of failures.
Normal_Operation
The purely formal transformations relating the control signals to patterns of state vari-
ables during normal operation may be analysed by the designer in advance, analytically or by
simulation studies, and stored in the instrumentation by the choice of structure and parameters,
and because of the large number of data involved and the boring nature of the task, the low lev-
els of the control system are always automated.  On account of the reversible, feedback nature
of the task., the operator can perform reliably in the higher, coordinating levels of the hierar-
chy., and the highest level, the control of the primary specifications for the production, will al-
ways be left to the human operator.  The amount of information to be presented to him by the
display equipment will be Very limited.  He has a need for the Presentation of accurate infor-
mation to be compared with the primary specifications, preferably in digital form with engi-
neering units, and of supplementary information indicating the response of the plant to his ad-
justments.  This information need not be very accurate, and coding in symbolic form, e.g. com-
puter-controlled graphic display corresponding to his formal transformation model, may be ad-
vantageous.
Abnormal Conditions during Failures
Under abnormal conditions a complicated co-operation exists between operator and
instrumentation.
The detection of departure from normal operation in plant or control system implies a
high degree of alertness and monitoring of a large amount of state information.  The limits of
normal operation can be defined by the designer in his analysis or during initial plant opera-
tion., and therefore detection will normally be fully automated.  Especially the great data-
handling capacity of the process computer opens the way to effective monitoring of system
properties, e.g. by supervision of dynamic properties or energy and mass balances.
The identification of failing system and the decision about proper counter-measures
call for a detailed evaluation of system information on plant anatomy, dynamic properties, eco-
nomic consequences of possible failures, and relevant counter-measures; the evaluation should
take into account failures not only in the plant, but also in the control system.  To protect both
plant and continuity of operation, the control system must be able to relate the corrective action
to the actual conditions in an optimal way, i.e. not to make the corrections more drastic than
necessary.  This implies very complicated transformations, and the control system will have to
include very general abilities, as represented e.g. by an operator or a digital computer., which
brings with it a great variety of failure modes in the control system,, the consequences of which
9cannot be fully uncovered by analysis in advance.  For this reason and. because of the need for
fast response, protection of the plant against r.najor breakdowns has to be automated.  This
must be done by a safety system the reliability of which can be proved by analysis.  Therefore
the designer must base it upon simple classifications of the possible failures in the plant char-
acterized by only a few state variables and upon simple and drastic actions, and he has to real-
ize the system by technical means, with only very limited operational possibilities (failure
modes).
To ensure a, high degree of operational continuity, minor failures have to be counter-
acted before they develop to a degree that initiates drastic actions from this safety system.  This
means that the control system should be able to apply countermeasures adapted to a great vari-
ety of failure modes in an optimal way, and this task may be wholly or partly automated or left
to the operator.
If a failure can. be counteracted by a feedback control action that maintains operation
under reasonable conditions (e. g. set-back of power) until fault finding and repair can take
place,, this may be done by a control system by purely formal transformations without detailed
identification of failure conditions.  Such action may be effected if abnormal state variables
initiate a shift in feedback loop references or acts as a constraint on optimizing or learning
control systems.  This mode of correction does not imply system information in the control
system that cannot be extracted from the system in an experimental mode; therefore the actions
need not be analysed in detail by the designer.
It is different in cases of failure that call for irreversible., open-loop correction.  Here
the control system has to go through the stens of identification., evaluation and decision, and
thus needs very detailed system information, which is not maintained during normal operation
and is therefore apt to degenerate.  The ability of the process computer to store large amounts
of data and complicated procedures invites automation of the task although it leaves the de-
signer with the need for very complicated analyses.
The identification of failure modes resulting from the designer's analysis could then
be stored in a pattern recognition procedure working on large number of state variables and re-
sulting in the initiation of a correcting sequence according to the designer's evaluation and de-
cision.
The designer may choose to base the protection of plant operation on human operators
for two reasons.  He may not be able to analyse the failure modes of the entire system to a de-
gree that permits economically optimal protection; in this case he wants the assistance of an
operator,, who stores the necessary system information as a physical understanding of plant and
instrumentation properties.  Or he may find it advantageous to utilize motor-skills in the op-
erator; in this case he may store in the operator the requisite system information in condensed
form as instructions controlling automatic stimulus-response action.
Quite often situations occur in which, formally, the operator is supposed to act auto-
matically in the stimulus-response mode in accordance with instructions., but where the real
function will be intelligent evaluation, and instructions therefore only act as task specifications.
This mixture is highly unreliable because of the different kinds of system information needed
in the two modes, and if intelligent operation is expected, this has to be formally accepted and
the system designed accordingly to support the operator.
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If Protection of continuity of operation is based upon intelligent actions by the op-
erator, the designer must face the fact that detailed system information imparted to the operator
during education is likely to degenerate, and that he will have a pronounced tendency to adapt
himself to automatic stimulus-response actions in failure situations he has experienced a num-
ber of times (e. g. instrument failure).  This will influence his response when the pattern related
to frequent events is part of a more complicated and risky situation.  The problem of the de-
signer is to support the operator in a way that facilitates the shift needed in his transformation
mode upon the detection of abnormal conditions.
This support may be given by an effective coding of the state information presented to
the operator or by storing system information resulting from the designer's analysis in the in-
strumentation in a way that makes it accessible in the actual situation.
The identification and evaluation calls for a great amount of detailed state informa-
tion, and the problem is to present this in such a way as to limit the number of data presented to
the relevant information, but also to present it in such a way as to force the operator to consider
all relevant data.
In conventional instrumentation., where state information is displayed by a continous
presentation of all measured data on individual meters,, the operator himself selects data and
chooses certain patterns corresponding to different subsystems or situations, and the designer
can in a simple way assist in this adaptation by the grouping of meters.
In a more advanced system, e. g. a computer-controlled display, the designer can in
advance define sets of state information related to characteristic subsystems, operational condi-
tions and control tasks.  The presentation of the relevant set in the situation concerned may be
initiated by a rather coarse identification, carried out by the operator or automatically by the
failure detecting routine (alarm analysis).
Only in the few cases where the operator has to compare state information with men-
tally stored. specifications (e. g. radiation levels) does he need accurate data, which may appro-
priately be presented as digital data.  By far the most important part of the identification and
evaluation will be intercomparison of data to evaluate their relations, for which analogue pres-
entation in some form of graphs or figures is most effective.  Equipment suited to this has been
developed to a large extent for computer-aided design.  This kind of data presentation corre-
sponds to the use by the operator of conventional displays, where he percieves the meter indi-
cations as patterns and only decodes by reading when he needs accurate data.  The widely used
line printers and. typewriters in today's computer installations may be seen as a relict from the
administrative use of computers.
Computer-controlled graphic displays allow the coding of a large amount of state in-
formation in a way that matches the mental transformation model of the operator and makes
possible an effective utilization of the operator's input capacity and a minimization of time and
effort needed for decoding.  In the identification and. evaluation, the operator's transformations
should be based upon a physical model to which the graphic displays must be related(schematic
diagrams from manuals?) whereas the graphic displays during normal operation may reflect his
stimulus-response mode of operation and thus be purely symbolic.  A change of graphic display
mode on the detection of failures may support the necessary change in the goal and mode of the
operation.
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When the operator has formed a hypothesis of the identity of the faulty system he may
need. supplementary information to test it, that is accessible detailed state information in the
form of accurate data or trends.  This may be effected, e. g. with a light pen working on the
graphic displays.
Efficient coding of state information in proper sets corresponding to different subsys-
tems, operational conditions and control tasks should increase the probability of the operator
using a great amount of relevant information as the basis of his first hypothesis.  This will
counteract his tendency to be stressed if he has to change his hypothesis several times, and his
tendency to limit his attention to only a few parameters in stressed situations.
Apart from effective coding of state information., the storage capacity of the digital
computer gives the designer the possibility of storing system information and supplying it to
the operator when needed.  If evaluations by the operator are wanted because of a limited abil-
ity of the designer to give a reliable analysis covering all abnormal conditions, the designer
should not store system information resulting from his simplified analysis as procedures and
data ending up with a suggestion to the operator of possible causes of failures; this would en-
hance the tendency of the operator to choose the probable and familiar explanations more read-
ily than those related to risky conditions.  In a well-designed plant risky failures are improbable
and therefore not likely to be included in the designer's suggestions.  As the operator's treat-
ment of the state information presented will be highly influenced by his expectations, he should
not be placed in a situation where he has to test a proposed but probably wrong hypothesis, but
rather in an open situation where he is supported by the designer by the presentation of system
information that limits his field of attention in a reliable way.  This may be done by automatic
procedures investigating only the most probable and trivial failures, which may be treated re-
liably in analysis.  In case of more complicated failures the instrumentation would then be able
to exclude as sources the most common failures which will first come to the operators mind,
and by indication of this enable the operator to devote time and effort to more realistic and im-
portant hypothesis.
The designer may want the assistance of the operator even in failure situations he is
able to analyses because he can effectively use the great variety of motor skills present in the
operator to carry out the correcting actions.  This is the case when automatic equipment and the
related testing and maintenance are inferior to human operation with respect to cost and reli-
ability.  Where that is so, he may support the operator by storing the instructions in the com-
puter, and initiating the presentation of these instructions to the operator by an automatic iden-
tification procedure, or he may support the operator by automatic interlock procedures.
To gain reliable operator function it is necessary clearly to define in which tasks the
automatic stimulus response to instructions is expected, and in which the operator is supposed
to make intelligent evaluations.  The system information stored and the coding of the presented
information used should be carefully planned accordingly.
This is not always the case in conventional systems where warning or alarm signals to
the operator calling for minor routine control actions are mingled with signals that may indicate
the advent of serious trouble.
Changes_in Operational Conditions.  Sequence Control
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A complicated sequence of control actions will be necessary in routine operations, e.
g. start-up, and in abnormal situations caused by failures.  As is the case during normal opera-
tion, the control task will be a hierarchical one the lowest level of which may be grouped in
fairly separate tasks related to the different subsystems of the plant, and which implies a lively
data traffic and is therefore normally automated.  The higher, coordinating levels may be auto-
mated or left to the operator.
Routine sequences, such as start-up, may be analysed by the designer and stored in
the instrumentation.  Frequent start-stop operations may be automated to provide a tightly con-
trolled function leading to better economy and less wear than manual operation.  In a plant ex-
posed to infrequent start sequences, automation may be advantageous as the operator may not
maintain proper training.  However, plants with infrequent starts may not have "routine start"
operations as the only shut-downs may be those due to maintenance and repairs; in such plants
restart asks for special planning and procedures.
The plant subject to abnormal start operations or correcting sequences after failure
detection may not be easily defined in the design phase, and optimal automation may thus not
be realized.  The operator may therefore be left with a sequence task the individual steps of
which may be routine operations based upon formal transformations, or operations that implies
careful evaluation depending upon the actual conditions of the system.  This switching to a
special mode of operation in single steps of a sequence the rest of which is routine may be en-
dangered by the tendency of the operator to lean on his past experience., and should be sup-
ported by a suitable way of presenting information to the operator.
Abnormal, but Planned Operation
Analysis may show that normal operation and sequence control as well as high-level
safety actions and lower level protection of operation can be automated to advantage, but even
so human operator problems remain.
All plants will be exposed to periods with operational conditions not considered by
the designer and under which the control and safety systems may therefore not be operating
reliably.
Such periods may occur during initial plant operation, start-up and operation follow-
ing upon major repairs., modifications of equipment, and. changes in operational policy.  This
makes it necessary that the designer clearly defines the operation conditions covered by the
automatic system.  Even automatic plants must therefore incorporate effective means of com-
munication between plant and operator and of manual intervention so that the task of the op-
erator during such periods may be safely planned and conducted.  This is the more important as
the different tasks may only be required infrequently.
Furthermore all automatic functions of a discrete and irreversible nature which do not
take place and are thus not tested in routine operation must be subjected to special test proce-
dures at regular intervals if they are not to degenerate.  Automation therefore only transfers the
human task from control and supervision of the plant continuously during operation to testing
and maintenance of the functioning of the automatic equipment.  The benefit of this will be that
the human operator is moved from a task in which he may be caught unawares by a badly de-
fined situation in stressed circumstances to a task that is concentrated in time and can be clearly
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defined and planned.  Furthermore the operator will have ample time to look up system infor-
mation in drawings and manuals.
In planned abnormal periods the operator stil-.L has both clearly defined tasks that
should be carried out in a prescribed way (testing), as well as open tasks needing intelligent
evaluation (protection, fault finding).
In his evaluation connected with fault location his procedure will not be bound by se-
rious considerations of risk if the plant is automatically protected, but only the probability of
his hypothesis has to be considered; this gives the designer increased possibility of supporting
him by appropriate displays of state and system information; even computer augmented prob-
lem solving procedures may be considered.
Reliability Data Sources
For a quantitative reliability prediction to be possible., the plant and control system
and its operation have to be broken down to elementary components and tasks so generally
used that reliable statistical material on failure mechanisms can be found from a variety of ap-
plications.  What is needed is statistical material on elementary component faults and on minor
incidents and mistakes., not on major accidents, which normally show only a low probability
coincidence of elementary faults.
Stores of failure data on plant and instrumentation components are forthcoming and
collection may be organized as all failing equipment will normally be repaired by a special
maintenance group.
Reports on minor or elementary human failures that do not lead to incidents or acci-
dents are not easily collected, and therefore valuable material may be obtained if recording of
operator manipulations is included in systems with advanced data logging equipment.
Some quantitative information may be obtained from experiments in psychological
laboratories, but this information seems mostly to be relevant for human stimulus-response
tasks, whereas the tasks involving intelligent evaluation seem to be so complicated and closely
related to the actual situation that results from laboratory experiments are extremely difficult to
relate quantitatively to operator behaviour in a plant environment.
Thus there seems to be a need for carefully planned and conducted experiments with
operators functioning tinder plant conditions or in simulated plant situations.
Other sources may be found if it is possible to break down the functioning of the op-
erator to subtasks which are important for his r-,ode of operation in other technical installations
from which statistical Yriaterial is available, such as traffic systems or experimental nuclear
installations where collection of failure reports is carefully organized.
Incidents and accidents reported within the nuclear field from research reactors, hot-
cells and chemical plants seem to give information of human behaviour in planned experi-
ments! periods related to periods of initial operation and modifications in industrial plants.  Re-
ports on aviation incidents and accidents may give information of the human onerator in ab-
normal situations where he is responsible for both detedtion, identification and decision.  Fi-
nally reports on railway traffic may bring light to operators in instructed sequence tasks.
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Conclusion
The control system of a power plant is characterized by two modes of operation.  One
is the reversible closed-loop operation, which is governed by system information in the form of
a formal response model.  This model may be realized by the designer by lay-out of structure
and choice of parameters in automatic equipment as a result of detailed analysis or by detailed
instruction of a human operator.  This system can cope with operational conditions analysed by
the designer. lie may also realize the response model by defining a goal for a control system,
automatic (Dr human, with experimenting and learning abilities, in which case the system can
also handle conditions not foreseen and analysed by the designer.  In this mode the control
system may effectively protect continuity of operation in cases of failure that leave time for and
physical possibilities of adaptation in the system.  Advanced learning or even selforganizing
systems seem to open a way to the designer for automation of protection without the unrealistic
task of covering failure analysis.
Another mode of operation is irreversible, open-loop control, which in all cases has to
be based on detailed physical analysis of the plant.  Again the designer may carry out the
analysis and condense the system information into formal response models present in the con-
trol system as a structure of automatic equipment or an instructed human operator.  In both
cases he is left with the problem of testing the performance to avoid degeneration.  In open-
loop control requirements that he has not been able to analyse he has no choice; he must rely on
the intelligent analysis by a human operator, who then has to work according to a detailed
physical model imparted to him by general education.  In all analysis - including that of the op-
erator - of open-loop control an important thing is that the choice of action should not be based.
solely upon a consideration of probability of success, but to a high degree upon evaluation of
risk.
In present-day power plants as well as future highly automated systems the human
operators will have these modes of operation mixed together, and to support the reliability of
his operation the designer has to relate the display of state and system information very care-
fully to the mode of operation.  Especially the shift from routine, formal model considering av-
erage cost to a detailed physical model considering immediate risk in unexpected situations
should be supported.
A fair choice between automatic and manual control in failure situations requires a
reliability assessment of automatic equipment, an intelligent operator and the designer's analy-
sis.
To this end vie feel a need for theoretical and experimental studies on the operator
under power plant conditions as intelligent supervisor, tester and repairman, which may enable
us to break down his mode of operation to elementary operations that can be related to the way
of resenting information to him in education and display, and for which reliability figures can
be obtained by experiments, preferably in plant environment.
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